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NO KNOCK SEARCH
WARRANTS IN GEORGIA
Published in The Georgia Defender, p. 1 (July 1996). There is a caselaw update at the end of the
article.
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.

No knock search warrants are issued frequently in Georgia nowadays, and such
warrants have "simply become customary in ... drug cases." Adams v. State, 201 Ga.
App. 12, 410 S. E. 2d 139, 141 (1991). But is the legality of such warrants firmly
established in Georgia? In my opinion, the legal authority for these warrants is shaky,
and I believe the Georgia Supreme Court, which has never passed on the validity of
the warrants, can be persuaded to hold that no knock warrants are illegal.
Alternatively, I think the Georgia Court of Appeals can be persuaded to overrule its
inadequately reasoned, unpersuasive precedents upholding no knock warrants.
Georgia has no statute specifically authorizing a magistrate to issue no-knock search
warrants. Yet the prevailing view in the United States is that no knock warrants may
not be issued absent specific statutory authorization. 2 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 621 (3d ed. 1996). Accord: State v.
Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 1994) (holding that no knock search warrants
are invalid in Florida because they have not been authorized by statute; "[n]o]-knock
warrants are disfavored under the law and limited largely to those states that have
enacted statutory provisions authorizing their issuance"). Nor have the courts of
Georgia advanced compelling reasons for permitting, despite the absence of statutory
authority, no knock warrants; the caselaw which allows such warrants solely on the
basis of judge-made law is unpersuasive and vulnerable to overruling.
Since 1972 there have been 30 reported Georgia appellate decisions--all in the
Georgia Court of Appeals--involving the actual issuance of a no knock search warrant
by a magistrate, and in not one of these cases did the Court hold that inclusion of a no
knock provision in the warrant required suppression of evidence. (These 30 decisions-one in the 1970's, 10 in the 1980's, and 19 thus far in the 1990's--are listed in
chronological order in the Appendix.)
In only three of these decisions, however, did the Court of Appeals actually examine
the issue of the validity of no knock search warrants. In Jones v. State, 127 Ga. App.

137, 193 S. E. 2d 38 (1972), the first Georgia appellate case involving a no knock
warrant, the Court held a no knock provision in a search warrant was valid because
the affidavit for the warrant stated that (1) according to informers the subject whose
residence was to be searched had threatened to shoot the next police who entered his
residence, and (2) the affiant felt that giving the subject notice would permit him to
flush the evidence. The Court's opinion contains no analysis or discussion, and the
cases cited in support of its holding that judges may, without statutory authorization,
issue no knock warrants are inapposite. It was nine years before the Court decided
another case involving a no knock warrant. In Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.
E. 2d 482 (1981), the no knock clause had been inserted into a warrant for gambling
paraphernalia based on a GBI agent's generalized, conclusory allegations about
gambling operations. Again citing an inapposite case, and without mentioning Jones,
the Court held that the clause was reasonable, permissible, and legal. Finally, in Hout
v. State, 190 Ga. App. 700, 380 S. E. 2d 330 (1989), the Court held that, where giving
notice of authority and presence would increase the peril of the officers executing the
warrant, a no knock provision in the warrant is authorized. The only authority cited by
the Court was an inapposite Georgia Supreme Court case.
More recently, in State v. Smith, 219 Ga. App. 905, 467 S. E. 2d 221, 222 (1996), the
Court, citing Jones, stated: "A search warrant with a no-knock provision may be
issued where the facts set out in the affidavit demonstrate exigent circumstances."
This statement was dicta, however, because the search warrant at issue did not have a
no-knock clause.
In none of these four cases did the Court even acknowledge the general rule that
judges lack the power to issue no knock warrants except where statutorily authorized;
nor did the Court give any good reasons why Georgia judges should, simply by
judicial fiat, assume the power to issue such warrants. In none of the cases did the
Court properly analyze the public policy considerations at issue; in particular, there
was a total failure to recognize the ``staggering potential [of no knock warrants] for
violence to both occupants and police,'' State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla.
1994). Georgia caselaw on no knock warrants is therefore weak at best.
Furthermore, since 1972, when the use of no knock warrants was first upheld in
Georgia, there has been an important advance in Fourth Amendment doctrine
concerning forcible entries to execute search warrants. When Jones, Cox, and Hout
were handed down in 1972, 1981, and 1989 respectively, OCGA Â§17-5-27, which
requires that generally officers executing a search warrant must give or attempt to
give verbal notice of their purpose and authority to the occupants of a building before
making a forcible entry, was deemed to "represent ... the common law rule," Barclay
v. State, 142 Ga. App. 657, 236 S. E. 2d 901 (1977), but not necessarily to involve a
Fourth Amendment requirement. However, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927

(1995), a unanimous U. S. Supreme Court held that the common law knock and
announce principle forms part of the reasonableness inquiry required by the Fourth
Amendment. Although the Supreme Court did not hold that all no knock entries are
forbidden, the Court's decision obviously casts new light on the issue whether Georgia
courts should permit the issuance of no knock warrants when the General Assembly
has declined to do so.
Recently, the Georgia Supreme Court has displayed an admirable respect for Fourth
Amendment values, on several occasions reversing Court of Appeals decisions
validating a search and seizure. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 422 S. E. 2d
546 (1992) (reversing Court of Appeals decision that search based on third-party
consent was valid); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 422 S. E. 2d 426 (1992) (overruling
numerous Court of Appeals decisions finding a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in Georgia). In view of (1) the unconvincing caselaw permitting no
knock warrants, (2) the public policy arguments not yet addressed by the Georgia
courts, and (3) the recent extension of the Fourth Amendment to entries to execute
search warrants, it is submitted that the Georgia Supreme Court should and can be
persuaded to overrule Georgia Court of Appeals caselaw allowing, in the absence of
legislative authorization, state magistrates to issue no knock warrants.
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court declines to decide the issue of the legality of no
knock warrants, it might be possible, for the reasons stated above, to persuade the
Georgia Court of Appeals, en banc, to overrule its own precedents and to leave to the
legislature, where it properly belongs, the decision as to whether state judges should
have the power to issue warrants allowing police to crash into people's homes without
first giving notice to the occupants. Recently, for example, the en banc Court of
Appeals overruled its own precedents permitting conditional guilty pleas. Hooten v.
State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 442 S. E. 2d 836 (1994).
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CASELAW UPDATE
MARCH 4, 2004
1. Poole v. State, 266 Ga. App. 113, 596 S. E. 2d 420 (2004) (armed with a search
warrant, about a dozen law enforcement officers from the Clayton County and Fayette
County Drug Enforcement Task Force teams went to Pooleâ€™s apartment; the
leading officer yelled, â€œSheriff's office, search warrant,â€ and breached the door;
once inside, officers seized less than one gram of cocaine, fifteen and a half grams of
marijuana, $200 in cash, scales, a handgun, and ammunition; Poole and another
person were inside the apartment and were arrested; Poole was charged with
possessing cocaine, possessing marijuana, and possessing marijuana with the intent to
distribute; where a search warrant is illegally executed, the subsequent course of
events is tainted; OCGA Â§ 17-5-27 requires a law enforcement officer entering an

occupied residence for the purpose of executing a search warrant to give or attempt to
give verbal notice of his authority and purpose and permits a forceful entry if the
person inside either refuses to admit him or refuses to acknowledge and answer the
verbal notice; the notice requirement of that Code section may be dispensed with,
however, by a no-knock provision in the warrant or by the presence of exigent
circumstances; exigent circumstances exist where the police have reasonable grounds
to believe that forewarning would either greatly increase their peril or lead to the
immediate destruction of the evidence; a search warrant with a no-knock provision
may be issued where the facts set out in the affidavit demonstrate exigent
circumstances; the warrant in this case did not contain a no-knock provision, and
Poole maintains that no exigent circumstances excused the officersâ€™ forceful
entry; it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the
facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knockand-announce requirement; the U. S. Supreme Court has rejected a blanket exception
to a knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations because it
overgeneralized the risks of danger in drug investigations and because it might be
applied to support blanket exceptions; in order to justify a no-knock entry, the police
must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under
the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence; in this case, the only information received by the officers in immediate
proximity to the time the warrant was being executed was that, before they could
make an announcement, a person inside the residence had looked out of and then left a
window; but there is no evidence that Robinson, who had placed Poole under
surveillance, believed that the person who peered through the window was Poole and
not some person unconnected with the suspected drug activity; there is no evidence
that Poole or the individual who peered through the window had a history of violence
or that either had threatened violence if law enforcement officers entered; there is no
evidence that Poole had packaged or located the drugs in the apartment for quick
disposal; the only reference in the record to harm to the officers or destruction of the
evidence is Robinson's testimony regarding a â€œpossibilityâ€ of such based only
on the fact that someone looked out a window and then left the window; while the
reasonableness standard for a forceful entry is not high, that testimony is simply
inadequate to establish reasonable grounds to believe that, in this case, forewarning
would have either greatly increased the officers' peril or led to the immediate
destruction of the evidence; moreover, had Robinson, an experienced and trained drug
investigator, believed that circumstances of this case made it essential for the officers
to reach the threshold of Pooleâ€™s residence undetected, he could have set forth in
his affidavit any facts that he believed demonstrated the need for an element of
surprise as a necessary precaution in executing the search warrant and sought approval
from the neutral magistrate for a no-knock provision; Robinson did not do so; to find

exigent circumstances in this case would amount to the adoption of a per se rule that
once law enforcement officers realize that an occupant of the premises to be searched
for drugs has discovered the officersâ€™ presence outside the premises, the notice
requirement is excused; because no exigent circumstances excused the officersâ€™
failure to comply with OCGA Â§ 17-5-27, the trial court erred in denying Pooleâ€™s
motion to suppress)

